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SHORT RESEARCH NOTE
How Would Pyrrho have been Socially Valued? Social 
Desirability and Social Utility of Conflict Regulation
Nicolas Sommet*, Alain Quiamzade† and Fabrizio Butera*
Mugny and his colleagues have shown that conflict is sometimes detrimental for learning, but other 
times beneficial, depending on how it is regulated. Yet, it is assumed that laypeople perceive conflict as 
uniformly negative. We argue that the valence of these lay perceptions depends on the mode of  conflict 
regulation. Epistemic and relational protective conflict regulation behaviors (integrative and  submissive 
response, respectively) can be described as more focused on the other than relational  competitive 
 conflict  regulation (self-confirmatory response); thus, they should be perceived as more socially desir-
able.  Moreover, epistemic and competitive regulations can be described as more focused on the self 
than  protective  regulation; thus, they should be perceived as more socially useful. First-year psychology 
 students (N = 119) participants  evaluated three bogus respondents allegedly regulating conflict in an 
epistemic, competitive, or protective manner. Results supported both hypotheses, suggesting that conflict 
is not to be avoided per se and can be positively valued as a function of its regulation.
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What is learning if not perpetual doubt? Pyrrho, the first 
Greek skeptic philosopher, advised sophists never to 
freeze their judgment because of the “acataleptic” nature 
of knowledge, that is, the impossibility to reach absolute 
certainty in knowledge. Many famous developmental and 
social psychologists were influenced by these Pyrrhonian 
conceptions (e.g., Berlyne, 1960; Kruglanski, 2004; Piaget, 
1936). Notable amongst them are Mugny and Doise, who 
proposed that socio-cognitive conflict played a central 
role in cognitive development (Mugny & Doise, 1978). For 
four decades, Mugny and his colleagues have shown that 
receiving conflicting information from another—when 
not freezing the epistemic process—has the potential to 
influence the receiver, lead him/her to integrate the two 
pieces of knowledge, and eventually result in learning 
(for reviews, see Doise & Mugny, 1984; Pérez & Mugny, 
1993; Mugny, Butera, Quiamzade, Dragulescu & Tomei, 
2003; Quiamzade, Mugny & Butera, 2013). Despite these 
benefits, conflicts are generally prevented in educational 
settings (DeCecco & Richards, 1974) and educators tend 
to avoid them (Uline, Tschannen-Moran & Perez, 2003). 
According to Johnson and Johnson (1985), this can be 
explained by the fact that “conflict is perceived negatively 
in our society and in our schools” (p. 354). In this research, 
we argue that the perceived value of conflict in laypeople 
may not be as uniform as generally supposed. Specifically, 
we use the so-called judge paradigm (Dubois, 1994) to 
determine how (target) individuals regulating conflict in 
different ways may be viewed and valued differently.
A Taxonomy of Socio-Cognitive Conflict 
Regulations
A situation of confrontation with a disagreeing other 
on a learning task has traditionally been referred to as 
 socio-cognitive conflict. This term derives from the fact 
that disagreement on a learning task includes a cogni-
tive component (related to doubt about the answer of 
the task) and a social component (related to doubt about 
the one’s and the interactant’s relative competence; for a 
short historical account of the development of this term, 
see  Quiamzade et al., 2013). Given these two components, 
there are two main ways in which conflict can be  regulated: 
epistemic and relational (Butera, Darnon & Mugny, 2010). 
First, when the climate of an interaction is not threat-
ening, the cognitive component of conflict overcomes 
its social component. In such a case, conflict regulation 
behavior can be described as both focused on the self (the 
individual’s position) and the interactant (the other’s posi-
tion; for such a conceptualization, see Blake & Mouton, 
1964; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Thomas & Kilmann, 1974). In 
other words, conflicting individuals question the validity 
of each standpoint regardless of the source of the infor-
mation. They use task-related criteria to distinguish the 
correct (or more valid) discursive elements from the incor-
rect (or less valid) ones (De Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer & 
Nauta, 2001). Early findings of Mugny and his colleagues 
revealed that during this decentering process (Quiamzade, 
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Mugny & Darnon, 2009) not only do individuals consider 
their own point of view, but they also put themselves in 
the shoes of the disagreeing other and are likely to pro-
gress (Mugny, De Paolis & Carugati, 1984; Mugny, Doise 
& Perret-Clermont, 1975–1976; Mugny, Giroud & Doise, 
1978–1979). This is why such conflict regulation has 
been designated as epistemic regulation (Quiamzade 
et al., 2013). It is also known as task-related conflict (in 
Organizational Psychology, Jehn, 1995) or co-construc-
tive critical argumentation (in Educational Psychology, 
Asterhan & Schwarz, 2009).
Second, when the climate is threatening, the social 
component of the conflict overcomes the cognitive com-
ponent. In such a case, individuals display a focus on 
their relative standing compared with the interactant, 
and engage in what has been termed as relational con-
flict regulation (Quiamzade et al., 2013). Recent research 
showed that relational conflict regulation entails two 
possibilities: (1) When individuals perceive that they are 
sufficiently competent to cope with the threat elicited 
by the  disagreement, conflict regulation behavior can be 
described as more focused on the self than on the other 
(favoring the validity of one’s position); (2) When individu-
als perceive that they are insufficiently competent, con-
flict regulation behavior can be described as more focused 
on the other than on the self (favoring the validity of the 
interactant’s position; for such a conceptualization, see 
Sommet, Darnon & Butera, 2015). 
In the former case, one confirms his/her own point of 
view to the detriment of the disagreeing interactant, that 
is, displays a dominant, active, and appetitive behavioral 
pattern (Butera, Gardair, Maggi & Mugny, 1998, Study 1; 
Butera, Mugny, Legrenzi, & Pérez, 1996; Butera & Mugny, 
2001, Study 7). This particular mode of relational conflict 
regulation is called competitive conflict  regulation (Darnon, 
Doll & Butera, 2007). In other research traditions, it is 
also known as contending tactics (De Dreu & Van Vianen, 
2001) or adversarial argumentation (Asterhan, 2013). 
In the latter case, one complies with the other’s position 
to the detriment of one’s own, that is, one displays a sub-
missive, passive, and aversive behavioral pattern (Carugati, 
De Paolis & Mugny, 1980–1981; Chaiken, 1987; Mugny 
et al., 1978–1979). This particular mode of relational con-
flict regulation is called protective regulation (Sommet 
et al., 2014) and is also known as conceding tactics (De 
Dreu & Van Vianen, 2001) or quick consensus seeking 
(Asterhan, 2013). Neither competitive relational regula-
tion nor protective relational regulation leads to further 
elaboration or cognitive progress (Buchs, Butera, Mugny 
& Darnon, 2004).
Disagreements are often assumed to be a difficult 
 experience, and some managerial techniques even aim at 
limiting their appearance (e.g., Nominal Group Technique, 
Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1974, in Amason, 1996). However, 
as we have just seen, conflict is multifaceted and—depend-
ing on the way it is regulated—it might not always be 
perceived as undesirable or useless. In order to predict 
when and how a particular form of conflict regulation 
(i.e., epistemic, relational-competitive, and relational-
protective) may be attributed some social value, we apply 
to this matter an important distinction introduced by the 
 literature on social judgment.
A Bi-dimensional Structure of Social Value
Beauvois (2003; Beauvois & Dubois, 2009) showed 
that the social value of persons or objects is organized 
along two orthogonal dimensions: social  desirability 
and social utility (for another theoretical framework 
making a similar distinction between warmth and 
 competence, see Abele, Cuddy, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2008). 
On the one hand, perception of behaviors varies along 
an unlikability-to-likability vertical axis. This axis cor-
responds to the  perceived ability of the social target to 
gain social approval, to adjust oneself to the motivation 
of the group to which s/he belongs. It pertains to affec-
tive traits like cold/warm, unreliable/good-natured, or 
antisocial/prosocial. On the other hand, perception of 
behaviors varies along an incompetence-to-competence 
 horizontal axis. This axis  corresponds to the perceived 
ability of the social target to reach social success, to adjust 
oneself to the social functioning of his/her environ-
ment. It pertains to adaptive traits like skilled/unskilled, 
 ambitious/passive, or  assertive/indecisive.
Social desirability is akin to concepts like expressiveness 
(how a person assumes an other-oriented role; Parsons 
& Bales, 1956), other-profitability (how advantageous 
the attribute of a person is for others; Peeters, 1992), or 
communality (how a person “gets along”; Wiggins, 2003). 
Socially desirable behaviors are typically those described 
as focused on the others, that is, as taking into account 
the perspective of others and involving benevolent 
interaction styles (for a similar proposition, see Abele & 
Wojciszke, 2007). Examples of socially desirable behav-
iors are organizational citizenship behavior at school 
(showing respect for peers and teachers; Jouffre, Esnard 
& Taillandier-Schmitt, 2012), consideration-oriented lead-
ership in organization (caring about subordinates’ well-
being; Dubois, 2010), or even modesty (Matteucci, 2014). 
Social utility is akin to concepts like instrumental-
ity (how a person takes a leadership role), self-profit-
ability (how advantageous the attribute of a person is 
for him/her), or agency (how a person “gets ahead”). 
Socially useful  behaviors are typically those described 
as focused on the self, that is, as sustaining the effective 
pursuit of one’s goals and involving the interest of the 
self. For instance, individualism (notably self-sufficiency, 
Dubois & Beauvois, 2005), structure-oriented leadership 
(being focused on goal achievement; Dubois, 2010) or 
 comparative optimism (expecting good outcomes for the 
self; Milhabet, Le Barbenchon, Molina, Cambon & Steiner, 
2012) are all perceived as socially useful. 
Importantly, some social behaviors could be described 
as focused on both the others and the self. For instance, 
individuals pursuing cooperative goals (i.e., mastery-
approach goals) show more positive attitudes towards 
helping others (Poortvliet & Darnon, 2014) and higher 
performance attainment (Van Yperen, Blaga & Postmes, 
2014); accordingly, it is not surprising that they are judged 
as both socially desirable and useful (Darnon, Dompnier, 
Delmas, Pulfrey & Butera, 2009).
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Hypotheses 
In this study, we investigate the possibility that conflict is 
not uniformly viewed as negative by laypeople. In the first 
section of this introduction, we have seen that individuals 
facing a disagreeing interactant could display  regulation 
behaviors described as focused on both the self and the 
other (epistemic conflict regulation), more on the self 
(the competitive mode of relational conflict regulation) 
or more on the other (the protective mode of relational 
conflict regulation). In the second section, we have seen 
that behaviors focused on the others are typically high in 
social desirability, whereas behaviors focused on the self 
are typically high in social utility. Hence, we formulated 
two hypotheses: (1) Epistemic and protective regulations 
should be perceived as higher in social desirability than 
competitive regulation; (2) Epistemic and competitive 
regulations should be perceived as higher in social utility 
than protective regulation. Questionnaires, raw data, and 
(Stata and SPSS) syntax files are available through  FigShare 
(https://figshare.com/s/5ab9e7425297aec0b37c; DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4768126).
Method
Participants 
A convenience sample of 120 first-year psychology stu-
dents from a French-speaking Swiss university filled out 
a questionnaire at the beginning of a lecture. All the 
students present that day participated in the study. One 
participant was removed due to missing data. The final 
sample was comprised of 101 women and 18 men, with a 
mean age of M = 21.76 (SD = 5.01).
Procedure and variables 
First, participants were provided with the description 
of a fictitious previous study in which dyads of students 
discussed the etiology of bipolar disorder. They were told 
that one of the two students thought the cause of the 
mental trouble to be nature-based (i.e., genetic determi-
nants), whereas the other thought it to be nurture-based 
(social determinants).1 
Participants were then provided with three sheets, 
each containing a nine-item socio-cognitive conflict 
 questionnaire allegedly completed by students from the 
previous study using a 1 = not at all to 7 = completely scale 
(Darnon, Muller, Schrager, Pannuzzo & Butera, 2006; 
Sommet et al., 2014). Specifically, participants were told 
that they would “evaluate the responses from three dif-
ferent [students]” collected following “situations of disa-
greement.” In the first bogus questionnaire, the alleged 
student from the previous study had answered 6 or 7 on 
the three items measuring epistemic regulation (e.g., “Did 
you try to examine the condition under which each point 
of view could help you understand?”). In the second ques-
tionnaire, another student had answered 6 or 7 on the 
three items measuring competitive regulation (e.g., “Did 
you try to resist by maintaining your initial position?”). 
In the third questionnaire, one last student had answered 
6 or 7 on the three items measuring protective regula-
tion (e.g., “Did you comply with your partner’s proposi-
tion?”). On each sheet, the score on the other six items of 
the questionnaire was 1 or 2 (for the example of a bogus 
questionnaire, see Appendix). The order of the sheets 
was counterbalanced, to account for order effects in the 
within-participant design.
For each questionnaire, participants were asked to 
evaluate the student “according to his/her responses” on 
seven traits using a 1 = not at all to 7 = completely scale. 
The measure was adapted from Darnon et al. (2009): Three 
of the traits pertained to social desirability ( “pleasant,” 
 “likable,” and “nice”) and four others to social utility 
(“likely to succeed,” “competent,” “gifted,” and “smart”). 
Descriptive statistics, reliability coefficients, and a correla-
tion matrix are reported in Table 1.
Results
Social desirability
As a specific pattern of results was expected, a contrast 
analysis approach was used (Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1991). 
The planned contrast aimed at testing Hypothesis 1, 
namely that epistemic and protective regulations should 
be perceived as higher in social desirability than competi-
tive regulation (respective weights: +1⁄3, +1⁄3, –2⁄3). 
The orthogonal contrast aimed at ensuring that the scores 
for epistemic and protective regulations were not dif-
ferent (weights: –1⁄2, +1⁄2, 0). A complete analysis of 
covariance was conducted in a preliminary stage, in order 
to test the effects of sex, age, and response sheet order. 
Age was found to interact with our planned  contrast, 
Table 1: Descriptive variables, coefficients of reliability and inter-variable correlations for the social value of conflict 
regulation.
Conflict  
regulation
Descriptive statistics Correlation matrix
α M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
Social desirability Epistemic (1) 0.90 4.53 1.18 1.00
Competitive (2) 0.92 2.95 1.22 –0.03 1.00
Protective (3) 0.90 4.32 1.14 0.21* 0.07 1.00
Social utility Epistemic (4) 0.90 4.31 1.10  0.53*** 0.19* 0.18† 1.00
Competitive (5) 0.89 3.90 1.09 0.11 0.54*** 0.28** 0.11 1.00
Protective (6) 0.90 3.42 1.11 0.01 0.22* 0.48*** 0.14 0.09 1.00
Note. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1.
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B = –0.06, 95% CI [–0.12, –0.01],2 F(1, 115) = 5.02, 
p = 0.027, η²p = 0.04. However, including this term did not 
change the effect and was not theoretically relevant. Thus, 
none of the covariates were kept in the analysis.
The planned contrast revealed a difference congruent 
with Hypothesis 1, B = 1.48 [1.20, 1.75], F(1, 118) = 114.70, 
p < 0.001, η²p = 0.49. As it can be seen in Figure 1 (white 
bars), the social desirability of epistemic regulation, 
M = 4.53 [4.31, 4.74], and protective regulation, M = 4.32 
[4.11, 4.52], was nearly one and a half point (out of seven) 
higher than the social desirability of competitive regula-
tion, M = 2.95 [2.72, 3.17]. The orthogonal contrast was 
not different from zero, B = –0.21 [–0.48, 0.05], F(1, 118) 
= 2.53, p = 0.115, η²p = 0.02, suggesting that the predicted 
pattern best accounted for the observed data.
Social utility
This time, the planned contrast aimed at testing 
 Hypothesis 2, namely that epistemic and competitive 
regulations should be perceived as higher in social util-
ity than protective regulation (respective weights: +1⁄3, 
+1⁄3, –2⁄3). The orthogonal contrast compared the scores 
for epistemic and competitive regulations (weights: –1⁄2, 
+1⁄2, 0). Preliminary analysis did not show any effect of 
sex, age, or response sheet order. Thus, none of the covari-
ates were kept in the analysis.
The planned contrast revealed a difference congruent 
with Hypothesis 2, B = 0.68 [0.45, 0.91], F(1, 118) = 34.34, 
p < 0.001, η²p = 0.23. As it can be seen in Figure 1 (grey 
bars), the social utility of epistemic  regulation, M = 4.31 
[4.11, 4.51], and competitive regulation, M = 3.90 [3.70, 
4.09], was between half a point and one point higher than 
the social utility of protective regulation, M = 3.42 [3.22, 
3.62]. However, the orthogonal contrast was found to 
be significant, B = –0.41 [–0.68, –0.15], F(1, 118) = 9.55, 
p = 0.003, η²p = 0.07, albeit having a descriptively smaller 
effect size. This indicated that the social utility of epis-
temic regulation was unexpectedly slightly superior to 
that of  competitive regulation.
Discussion 
In the present study, the perceived social value of conflict 
was found to differ as a function of its mode of regulation. 
In line with Hypothesis 1, regulating a conflict in an epis-
temic (combining one and another’s views) or protective 
way (conforming to another’s views) was judged as more 
socially desirable than regulating conflict in a competitive 
way (confirming one’s views). This is consistent with the 
fact that social desirability is linked with  other-profitability, 
that is, communal attributes which are directly  profitable 
to others (e.g., altruism, Esnard & Jouffre, 2008). As noted 
in the Introduction, epistemic and relational protective 
regulation behaviors may be described as including a focus 
on the other, whereas relational competitive regulation 
may not, and indeed the  present results show that they are 
perceived by laypeople as more socially desirable.
In line with Hypothesis 2, regulating a conflict in an 
epistemic or competitive way was judged as more socially 
Figure 1: Social desirability and social utility of epistemic regulation (critical treatment of one’s and other’s views), 
relational competitive regulation (confirmation of one’s views to the detriment of the other’s views), and relational 
protective regulation (complying with other’s views to the detriment of one’s own views). Note. Error bars represent 
95% confidence intervals (CI).
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useful than regulating conflict in a protective way. This is 
consistent with the fact that social utility is linked with 
self-profitability, that is, agentic attributes which are prof-
itable for the self (e.g., self-sufficiency, Dubois & Beauvois, 
2005). As noted in the Introduction, epistemic and rela-
tional competitive regulation behaviors may be described 
as including a focus on the self, whereas relational protec-
tive regulation may not, and indeed the present results 
show that they are perceived by lay people as more socially 
useful.
Given that epistemic conflict regulation is perceived as 
both socially desirable and useful, one may wonder why 
conflict is viewed negatively by educators and seldom 
implemented. This may be explained by two reasons. 
First, the general public—and even professionals such 
as teachers, social workers and managers—view conflict 
as being primarily a matter of diverging interests rather 
than a confrontation of different ideas. Conflicts between 
individuals are often interpreted as relationship rather 
than task conflicts, as involving an emotional rather than 
intellectual component, and in which disputants are 
seeking to win rather than a compromise (Pinkley, 1990). 
Second, individuals often experience conflicts as anxiety-
provoking, stressful, and uncomfortable (Narayanan, 
Menon & Spector, 1999). Conflict-avoidance is a common 
behavioral response to conflict (e.g., among teachers, 
 Morris-Rothschild & Brassard, 2006). Thus, emphasizing 
the possibility for conflicts to be regulated in an epistemic 
way may change supervisors, perceived social value of con-
flict and encourage them to try to use conflicts as a tool 
for learning or problem solving (e.g., using a constructive 
controversy procedure, Tichy, Johnson, Johnson & Roseth, 
2010; using conflict-related interventions, Afzalur Rahim, 
2002).
Three limitations should be acknowledged. First, the 
present research is a single-study report. Regardless of the 
large effect sizes (η²p s > .14; Richardson, 2011), the study 
should be replicated before definite conclusions can be 
drawn. In a further experiment, one could use the so-
called self-presentation paradigm to confirm the social 
desirability of conflict regulation (e.g., Guignard, Bertoldo, 
Goula & Apostolidis, 2015, Study 1). When instructed to 
present oneself in a positive way, participants should 
report more epistemic and protective regulations and less 
competitive regulation than when asked to make a nega-
tive impression.
Second, the orthogonal contrast for social utility was 
small but significant, indicating that epistemic regula-
tion was unexpectedly judged as being more socially use-
ful than competitive regulation. As focus on the self is a 
continuous rather than a dichotomous variable,  epistemic 
regulation may be perceived as more self-profitable than 
competitive regulation, accounting for this observed 
residual difference. 
Third, we did not assess the extent to which conflict 
regulation behaviors are perceived by participants as 
focused on the self and/or the other. We have pointed out 
that the set of relations between conflict regulations and 
focus on the self and/or the other laid out in the introduc-
tory section are based on existing definitions and results 
(Quiamzade et al., 2013; 2014): Epistemic and protective 
regulation behaviors are, in essence, oriented toward 
the other (showing a behavioral tendency to take into 
account the other’s perspective), whereas epistemic and 
competitive regulation behaviors are, in essence, oriented 
toward the self (showing a behavioral tendency to take 
into account one’s own perspective). In future research, 
it would be interesting to test whether the relationship 
between epistemic or protective regulation behaviors and 
social desirability is mediated by the perception of the 
other-based nature of such behaviors; and whether the 
relationship between  epistemic or competitive regulation 
behaviors and social utility is mediated by the perception 
of the self-based nature of such behaviors.
Despite these limitations, the present research 
show that—contrary to what is generally assumed—lay 
 perceptions of disagreement are not always negative. In 
particular, when regulated in an epistemic way, conflict is 
valued as both desirable and useful. This is an important 
finding because, with such a regulation, socio-cognitive 
conflict is not a zero-sum game in which there would be 
a winner and a looser: both interactants can learn and 
progress (Ames & Murray, 1982). Our findings show that, 
if procedures aiming at structuring conflict positively are 
used, disagreements might be socially accepted and useful. 
Notes
 1 For exploratory reasons, the status of the disagreeing 
partner of the bogus study was manipulated. The tar-
get of judgement was always presented as a bachelor 
student, whereas the disagreeing interactant could 
either be another undergraduate (n = 62) or a PhD stu-
dent (n = 57). Since conflict is generally regulated in a 
more protective way with more competent threaten-
ing others (Quiamzade, Tomei & Butera, 2000, Study 
1), one could have expected this regulation to be dif-
ferently valued when the disagreement involved the 
PhD student. However, the status-variable did not pre-
dict the evaluation of social desirability (ps ≥ 0.453) or 
social utility (ps ≥ 0.745) of any of the three modes of 
conflict regulation, probably because it did not entail 
any threat for the participant. The present results hold 
regardless of the level of relative competence of the 
interactants and the induction is not considered in the 
present manuscript. Moreover, the questionnaire also 
included achievement goal items (Elliot & McGregor, 
2001). Since these results are beyond the scope of the 
research question of the present article, they are not 
reported.
 2 Starting from here, the “95% CI” is not specified. Thus, 
brackets signal a 95% confidence interval.
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